An Academic Treatment of the American-Israeli Alliance

We haven't given up on this, James and I. How people find time to "blog" on a daily basis, I'll never know. I was working full-time with Mathematica Policy Research out of Princeton, NJ in the spring and summer and now am back in college, at the University of Richmond. To give you a sample of what we work on in our daily lives, I'll present you with a paper I turned in which shows how our values permeate every aspect of what we do. The following was written for a public policy class. It's long--but I'd like to think it's worth a glance.
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With Friends Like These: A Re-thinking of the Israeli-American Relationship
By Anthony G. Galasso, Jr.

Introduction and Overview

American foreign policy in the Middle East is multi-faceted, involving a wide range of interests and dangers that need to be kept balanced in order to protect American national interests. The two major American interests in the Middle East are both fundamental and dire. They are national security and economic security: security against those in the region that undertake violent reprisals against America’s advancement of its interests; and security to keeping the oil flowing which runs through the veins of the American economy itself. In such a precarious situation, any matter of policy that hurts the United States in the region should be examined and reconsidered. To determine which initiatives are beneficial, and which are harmful, none should be spared from close scrutiny. The stakes are too high and the risk too great to continue along any course which endangers the balance that protects these vital American interests.

The United States’ longstanding policy of support for the State of Israel is one that requires such an examination. The alliance between the two nations has made itself open to criticism on several points. First, there is the fact that the United States is the primary arbitrator in the dispute between the Palestinians and the Israelis over the creation of an independent Palestinian state, and some view America’s relationship with Israel as rendering the impartiality necessary in such a role impossible. In addition, Arab resentment against Israel caused by that conflict is seen to lead to a “linking” of the United States with Israel, forcing the United States to bear a larger brunt of the hostility directed towards Israel in the region. Finally, there is also the argument that the alliance has become one-sided; Israel’s strategic importance has lessened since the end of the Cold War, continuing to arm the Israelis causes only instability in the region, which exacts to high of a cost for the United States in the context of American national security.

The Existence of American-Israeli Linkage

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Robert Malley, the Middle East Program Director of the International Crisis Group, summed up the problems the relationship between America and Israel has posed for America in the Arab world. In his eyes, America is hurt by “the perpetuation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the perpetuation of the perception, right or wrong, of excessive U.S. disengagement and excessive U.S. bias¹.” In other words, the failure of the United States to broker a lasting peace between Palestine and Israel has led to widespread resentment among Arabs, fuelled by an idea it is America’s favoritism towards Israel that has stalled Palestine’s attempts at freedom.

Malley is not alone in these assessments. Mahmood Monshipouri, chairman of the political science department at Quinnipiac University voiced similar concerns in a paper detailing what he termed the “paradoxes” of American foreign policy in the Arab world². The breed of radical Islam that the United States finds itself at war with currently has its roots in Arab defeats at the hands of Israelis in wars in which Israel was the recipient of vast amounts of American aid³. This extreme religious and political ideology is only intensified by what is seen as “contradictory U.S. diplomacy” in mediating between Israel and Palestine, where the failure of the peace process has created “enormous credibility problems for the United States”⁴. It appears to be the case that, due to American support for Israel, the United States is abetting the Palestinians’ plight while attempting to free them⁵. American stature in the region is wounded by forcing allied Arab nations, for instance the Gulf States and Egypt, to be silently complicit in this “double standard.”⁶ The difficulty is summed up by Monshipouri thusly: “With the United States playing the dual role of principal mediator of the conflict as well as [that of] the chief diplomatic, financial and military supporter of Israeli occupation forces, U.S. policy is mired in contradiction.”⁷

A Pew Research Center poll of “influential people in politics, media, business, culture and government” from around the world, including Islamic and Middle Eastern countries, seems to show that these views are widespread. 95% said “yes” when asked “Has the United States been too supportive of Israel?” 57% considered US support for Israel a major reason for dislike of America in their respective countries, while 33% considered it a minor reason⁸.

This linking of American and Israeli interests in the Arab mind jeopardizes other American initiatives in the region. In September of 2005, Pakistan and Israel held their first formal talks in history when Khurshid Kasuri, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan met Silvan Shalom, the Israeli Foreign Minister, in Turkey. What would seem to be a major step forward has caused civil unrest in Pakistan. Quasi Hussain Ahmed, the head of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), the main opposition group to General Pervez Musharraf’s Pakistani government, publicly called for the “overthrow [of] the Musharraf government.” Another MMA leader warned that “steps taken towards recognition of Israel will be stopped by force.” Most troubling to American interests, however, is the fact that a protest against Israel sparked by Pakistan opening up diplomatically towards Israel doubled as a protest against the United States. American and Israeli flags were burned together. As protestors claimed “Israelis are murderers of Palestinians” and that “[t]he meeting was an insult to the sentiments of 150 million people in Pakistan,” Musharraf was denounced as a “stooge of…President George [W.] Bush,” and protesters maintained “[f]riends of Jews are foes of Muslims.”⁹

The confusing of the United States and Israel in the public mind in a place like Pakistan is dangerous. The United States has become increasingly reliant on Pakistan’s cooperation in its efforts to destroy global terrorism. To potentially lose Pakistan’s cooperation as a result of a wave of popular resentment would be a major setback; to have it happen due to Israeli actions where America and Israel have become inseparable in the public mindset is far worse. America’s position is tenuous enough in places like Pakistan due to the “war on terror;” the United States needs to be mindful of policy decisions which would make it even more precarious than it already is.

These opinions do not necessarily indicate that there is actually a double standard in American policy; they do, however, demonstrate that American efforts to promote peace in the Middle East are having the opposite of their intended affect. Instead of mitigating radical Islam, American policy is giving it strength. Why have the fortunes of Israel and the United States become so closely tied together in the Middle East? In order to answer that question, a deeper look at the American-Israeli alliance is in order.

The American-Israeli Alliance

The growth of the ties between the United States and Israel has been termed as moving “from handshake to embrace.”¹⁰. At the outset, the United States kept its distance from Israel, but beginning in the 1960s America began to offer military aid and view Israel as a strategic asset. By 1976, Israel was the largest recipient of American aid worldwide. In 1987, Israel was declared a “major non-NATO ally.”¹¹ Today the relationship is as strong as ever. What prompted this massive American investment in Israel? What value does the United States see in maintaining this alliance? And, are the answers to the previous questions still relevant in the face of a changing world?

Israel has, since the beginning of its existence, has depended on foreign aid for its national defense and sought a relationship with the United States¹². The United States hesitated in the first decade of Israel’s existence to deal them arms directly¹³. Mordechai Gazit, a Fellow of the Harry S Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at Hebrew University, relates an exchange between Prime Minister David Ben Gurion of Israel and American President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1955 and 1956, following the Egyptian arms deal with the Soviet Union. Ben Gurion directly asked for American arms, fearing a tipping of the balance of power with the new influx of Soviet weaponry into Egypt and that a lack of American aid would “leave Israel without adequate capacity for its self defence [sic]”¹⁴. Eisenhower refused, stating that “[w]e are trying to prevent an arms race in the region.” Eisenhower believed that Israel, because of its size and position, should not seek military equity with its Arab neighbors, but rather peace¹⁵. In response, Israel “completely rejected [Eisenhower’s] analysis” and sought a country who would sell them arms; they eventually reached an agreement with France that would last for a decade¹⁶. Gazit considers this episode to be “forgotten,” and with the changes that would come in the United States’ treatment of Israel, he would seem to be correct¹⁷.

The coming of the 1960s saw the United States change from a policy preventing arms races in the Middle East, to a policy of arms balance¹⁸. The change came with the Presidency of John F. Kennedy, who made the first direct arms sale to Israel in 1962¹⁹. Kennedy was also the first one to speak of a “special relationship” between the United States and Israel, making the claim to Golda Meir in 1962 “that in case of an invasion, the US would come to the support of Israel.”²⁰

Between 1962 and 1973, three important events would cement the newfound American-Israeli “special” relationship. First, in 1967, France would terminate arms sales to Israel, and Israel would prevail in the Six Day War. American military support to Israel increased 450% in the next year²¹. In 1970, the “Black September” crisis occurred in Jordan, which is considered the time Israel “proved its worth” to the United States²². Black September occurred when fighting broke out in Jordan between Palestinians there and the Jordanian army. Israel claimed at the time that Syria had invaded Jordan to aid the Palestinians. They were prepared to invade Jordan to repel the Syrians, but in the end the Jordanians prevailed²³. Israeli leaders such as the late Yitzhak Rabin claimed credit in preserving the Jordanian regime and proving to the United States that they and Israel had a common interest in the region²⁴. However, former US Ambassador to Qatar and political and economic consultant Andrew I. Killgore counters that claim. According to Killgore, Israel actually “did nothing” during the Black September crisis, and that the reaction of the United States was not so much gratitude, but fear that Israel would, in President Richard Nixon’s own words, “have demolished the Syrians and gone right on to Damascus.”²⁵ Still, Israel became to be seen as a “means to combat Soviet influence in [the] Arab world.”²⁶

Finally, in 1973, the third and strongest bond between Israel and the United States was formed in the Yom Kippur War. A surprise attack by Syria and Egypt took a heavy toll on Israeli forces, who were caught unaware and found to have severe strategic disadvantages in terms of manpower and readiness²⁷. President Nixon, to counter Soviet aid to Egypt and Syria, had American forces stationed in Europe open an “air bridge” to strengthen Israel.²⁸ Israel was bolstered enough to reverse their fortunes and eventually secured victory. During the Yom Kippur War, military aid from the United States to Israel increased 800%.²⁹ The commitment to Israel became a contentious issue, both because of the cost to American taxpayers and because of growing “Arab resentment over favoritism towards Israel.”³⁰ As Killgore phrases it, a “pattern” began to emerge: “Israeli ‘victories’ were being won at ever increasing cost to the United States.”³¹

Since 1976, Israel has been the largest recipient of aid from the United States, despite the fact that the amount of aid has tapered off slightly since it peaked at 4 billion dollars under the Carter administration in 1979³². The planned foreign operations spending bill for the fiscal year 2006, approved by the House and soon to pass the Senate, would include 2.3 billion dollars for Israel³³. To contrast, Egypt would receive $1.3 billion from the bill; Afghanistan, $430 million; Pakistan, $300 million; and the West Bank and Gaza Strip $150 million, which would not go directly to the Palestinian Authority but rather towards US Agency for International Development concerns.³⁴

In this thirty year time span, the United States and Israel have developed mutual strategic initiatives and held joint military maneuvers. American economic assistance to Israel was converted from grants to loans in 1981, Israel was named the “largest foreign participant” in President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, and in 1989 the United States agreed to keep a stockpile of military supplies available to Israel in the event of a crisis³⁵. In 2005, looking forward, not much has changed. President George W. Bush’s re-election in 2004 was hailed by Israeli newspapers: “The Friend Stays On,” and “Bush is Good For Israel” headlines read, and the opinion in the press seemed confident that “[t]he president will continue back up Israel’s military moves in the territories and supporting Sharon’s disengagement plan.”³⁶ Israel also sees America’s longstanding criticism of Iran as favorable, since Israel considers Iran its greatest threat in the Middle East.³⁷ President Bush seems to be on the same page. On February 18, 2005, the Daily Telegraph in London reported that when asked if he would support Israeli attempts to disrupt the Iranian nuclear program, Bush answered:

“Clearly, if I was the leader of Israel and I’d listening to some of the statements by the Iranian ayatollahs that regarded the security of my country, I’d be concerned about Iran having a nuclear weapon as well. And in that Israel is our ally, and in that we’ve made a very strong commitment to support Israel, we will support Israel if her security is threatened.”³⁸

As different as the world is in 2005 when compared to 1976, one thing that has not changed is America’s commitment to Israel. Even with the end of the Cold War and the change of American worries in the Middle East from being caused by aggressive Arab nationalism to the threat of sub-national religion-inspired terrorism, the course of history and the stance of the current administration do not seem to indicate that any reduction in American support is forthcoming. With the violent ramifications of the linkage of America and Israel so readily apparent in the Islamic world, it comes time to take a look at this “special relationship” in another context.

The Question of National Security

At this point, it is apparent that in the Islamic world, America and Israel are seen as one and the same, with a common interest and common goals that are widely considered injurious to Arab and Muslim interests. This view comes from over 40 years of American support for Israel, which has only ever increased during that span of time. Even if the monetary figure of actual aid given was reduced, as it was in the early eighties, the level of military investment and the extent to which Israel’s existence was a priority for the United States reasonably justifies the opinion that where and when Israel moves, the United States moves also. However, the world is a very different place now than when the Israeli-American relationship began. The Soviet Union is no longer there to funnel arms to Arab states. With the overthrow of the Iraqi government, Israel no longer faces a conventional military threat from an Arab neighbor. The problem, for both Israel and the United States, involves sub-national terrorist groups who use unconventional warfare to further intermingled political and religious goals. The power of these groups is such that they’ve struck American interests worldwide, most dramatically on American soil itself. The question that American foreign policymakers should ask themselves is: with the world as different as it is now, and with the United States facing the threats it does, is the relationship with Israel worth the investment, when viewed in terms of our national security?

Indeed, some critics would argue that the United States has always put more into the alliance than it has received in return. There has often been tumult between Israel and the United States. In the fight for Israeli independence, the Soviet Union, and not the United States, was Israel’s first target for an arms supplier. Israel triumphed in large part to arms procured from Soviet satellite Czechoslovakia. In the words of historians Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley, “Israel was born, thanks in large part to Russian military support and American negotiating skill.”³⁹ Russian support for Israel would be sacrificed within the decade when Nasser’s Egypt became the Soviet Union’s foothold in the Middle East.⁴⁰ In 1967, during the Six Day War, Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats attacked the USS Liberty, which was in international waters off the coast of Gaza. Thirty-four sailors were killed, and 174 others were wounded. Israel claimed they mistook the ship for an Egyptian ship and that the ship was inside of the war zone, claims that are disputed by the surviving sailors themselves and government officials such as former Secretary of State Dean Rusk⁴¹. Also, in the late seventies and early eighties, Israel repeatedly used weapons sold to them by the United States for defensive purposes in offensive operations, in violation of US law: in Lebanon in 1978, 1979, and 1982, and against an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.⁴² More recently, the United States has been put in the awkward position of having to allow Israel to act in violation of UN Security Council resolutions while at the same time attempting to uphold them by force in places such as Iraq⁴³. In all cases, however, the United States did not allow these difficulties to prevent the relationship from growing. The importance which the United States has placed in Israel throughout the years has allowed Israel a degree of American indulgence few other nations enjoy.

The net effect of this deep but troubling relationship has been threats against American security, both in terms of safety and economics. The oil producing nations of the Middle East, whom the United States depends on for energy and who depend on the United States for defense, are faced with populations who see the Palestinian struggle as their own and are fiercely anti-Israeli. Also, American policy towards Israel since the Kennedy administration has focused on arms balance between Israel and its Arab neighbors. However, with the changes that have occurred since that time, that arms buildup has actually contributed to instability in the region. Arms sales, both to Israel and Arab states, has militarized the region and stifled democratic change by reinforcing power-driven regimes⁴⁴. Now that Israel stands alone in terms of conventional military might, the Israeli nuclear arsenal, unacknowledged officially but believed to exist, has served as a pretext for other states to develop weapons of mass destruction to counter, such as Iran and previously Iraq⁴⁵. In short, the American bolstering of Israel has caused two major threats to two fundamental foreign policy goals: national security is threatened by the unrest, instability, and militarization of the region, and economic security is threatened by the precarious position of the oil states, caught between the pro-Israel United States and their anti-Israel populations.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In short, the United States’ long and checkered history with Israel has jeopardized our interests in the region and threatened our national security. President Eisenhower’s “forgotten” recommendation to avoid a Middle Eastern arms race—forgotten certainly by Israel and Eisenhower’s successors—seems to take on new relevance in the current context.

What can be done? Total abandonment of Israel would be an unwise and shortsighted solution. The immediate answer for the United States is to bring about a fair, equitable two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recognized this in a February 2004 Senate hearing on the Israeli peace process entitled The Middle East: Rethinking the Road Map :

Conflict in the Middle East is one of our most intractable foreign policy problems. It has brought not only bloodshed and suffering to the people of Israel and Palestine, it has contributed to the poisoned ideology of radical Islamic extremists who have perpetuated terrorist acts on people in countries all over the world. American national security would be dramatically improved by the achievement of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement.⁴⁶

Mahmood Monshipouri agrees, not just in terms of national security, but also in terms of economic security: “Many oil experts concur that the best way to preserve stability would be to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”⁴⁷

What can be done that has not been attempted before? Robert Malley put a new direction in his testimony before the Senate on the future of the “Road Map to Peace” between Israel and Palestine. He places the blame for failures to broker peace in the conflict as due to a “lack of engagement” and a “lack of resolve.” This peace process should become America’s number one foreign policy priority. First, the United States and Israel would not be making the decisions alone, but in concert with Arab leadership and the European Union. They will collaborate in a plan that will not attempt to bring about peace in incremental steps, as has already been done, but within a larger framework with definite goals that would be publicly supported by Arab leadership. From there, mutual security guarantees from Palestine and Israel would be given to the multi-national group. This group will then oversee the transfer of power to the Palestinians and ensure a orderly exit of Israeli forces. This would prevent the shock and disorder than an immediate withdrawal and turnover to the Palestinian Authority would create. And third, and most crucially, the plan would be submitted to both the Israelis and the Palestinians in a referendum, as both parties have come to accept the two-state solution.⁴⁸

Malley goes on to add that a change in Palestinian leadership should not be a condition of any peace plan. Also, the territory allotted to the Palestinians needs to be contiguous and enough to make a viable state. The Palestinian authority would have to guarantee security during Israeli pull-outs, and Israel should not make up for land lost in Gaza with harsh countermeasures in the West Bank.⁴⁹

Malley’s plan is important because it includes measures that have been lacking in previous attempts in the peace process: first, it brings in Arab and European states to minimize the stigmatized appearance of the United States and Israel existing in opposition to the Arab world and Europe. Second, it allows for Palestinian popular sovereignty and legitimacy of Palestinian leadership, making it seem like a truly impartial, mutually achieved agreement. Third, it includes the support of Arab leadership, which will increase the legitimacy of the plan among the Arab people, who are extremely sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. And, fourth, and most importantly, Israel would be restrained from repressive security measures and attempts at land grabs from Palestinian territories, which fuel Palestinian unrest, thanks to international guarantees.

The plan would require a serious commitment of American patience and diplomatic effort, but the potential for a peaceful and just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would improve the United States’ position in the region, by reducing the plight of the Palestinians and restoring some measure of credibility to American diplomacy. It would be much more beneficial for American security and economic interests than the status quo ever has been or ever will be.

In the long run, the best course of action for American foreign policy in the United States would be a reappraisal of our relationship with Israel. The principle behind it would be undoing the years of arms buildup, and focusing on equity in terms of prosperity instead of armaments. Of the $2.3 billion that will be appropriated to Israel in 2006, $240 million of it consists of purely economic assistance. By contrast, of the $1.3 billion that will be given to Egypt, $495 million will be purely economic assistance.⁵⁰ Israel receives more money for its military, while Egypt receives a greater share for economics. If future foreign policy focused on reducing military aid while sustaining or increasing limits of economic aid, three positives would occur: first, Israel would lose its position as the largest recipient of American aid due to reasons of need alone. This would weaken negative American-Israeli linkage while at the same time in no way constituting an abandonment of Israel. Second, Arab nations would receive aid based on their great need, increasing Arab prosperity through American investment while at the same time reducing the arms buildup in the region. Third, the overall cost to the American tax payer would be reduced, while at the same time the amount of funding being devoted to positive ends is increased. America will no longer be spending vast amounts of money simply to endanger itself.

In short, Israel was seen as a means to an end: to serve as a counterbalance in the region to Soviet arms and Arab nationalism. However, as Israel grew, strengthened by a singular outpouring of American aid over the course of decades, it became too powerful and ended up tipping the balance of power in its favor after initially being seen as disadvantaged. The price of Israel’s success has been high for the United States, both monetarily and in terms of prestige and security in the Middle East. The cost is simply too much as far as America’s national security is concerned. The world has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War and policy needs to be able to adapt. The lessons learned from the American-Israeli experience should be that promoting regional stability through an arms race has backfired. The initial goal of American policy in the region, peaceful co-habitation, should be revisited. To do so would create a better life for all parties involved, and contribute more in terms of security and success to American interests. America’s wealth and influence could very easily serve as a peacemaker, instead of an arms dealer. While this shift will require a new redoubling of effort and many risks, our national security is too important to continue gambling on the status quo.
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Notes:

1. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee of Foreign Relations, Hearing on the Middle East: Rethinking the Road Map, Panel Two, 108^th Cong., 2^nd sess., 2004. Lexis-Nexis Academic (29 November 2005).

2. Mahmood Monshipouri, “The Paradoxes of U.S. Policy in the Middle East,” Middle East Policy 9, no. 3 (2002): 65. Expanded Academic ASAP, InfoTrac (29 November 2005).

3. Monshipouri, 67.

Andrew I. Killgore, “Israel: No Strategic Asset,” Journal of Palestine Studies 14, no. 2 (1985): 223. JSTOR (29 November 2005).

Martha Wenger, “US Aid to Israel: From Handshake to Embrace,” Middle East Report, no. 164/165 (1990): 14-15. JSTOR (29 November 2005).

4. Monshipouri, 67-68.

5. Monshipouri, 68-69.

6. Monshipouri, 68.

7. Monshipouri, 69.

8. The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Has the United States been too supportive of Israel or don’t you think so?” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 19 December 2001. Polling the Nations, (29 November 2005).

The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Do you think each of the following is a major reason, a minor reason, or not much of a reason that some people in our country dislike the US? Support of Israel,” Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 19 December 2001. Polling the Nations, (29 November 2005).

9. Agence France Presse, “US and Israeli Flags Torched in Pakistan Protests over Bilateral Talks,” Agence France Presse—English, 2 September 2005. Lexis Nexis Academic (1 December 2005).

10. Wenger, 14.

11. Wenger, 14-15.

12. Mordechai Gazit, “The Genesis of the US-Israeli Military Strategic Relationship and the Dimona Issue,” Journal of Contemporary History 35, no. 3 (2000), 413. JSTOR (29 November 2005).

13. Wenger, 14.

14. Gazit, 413.

15. Gazit, 413-414.

16. Gazit, 414.

17. Gazit, 413.

18. Gazit, 414.

19. Wenger, 14.

20. Gazit, 414-415.

21. Wenger, 14.

22. Wenger, 14.

Killgore, 223.

23. Killgore, 223-224.

24. Killgore, 224.

25. Killgore, 224.

26. Wenger, 14.

27. Killgore, 222-223

28. Encylopaedia Britannica, online ed., s.v. “Israel.” Encyclopaedia Britannica Online <http://search.eb.com/eb/article-219432> (1 December 2005).

Killgore, 222-223.

29. Wenger, 14.

30. Killgore, 223.

31. Killgore, 223.

32. Wenger, 14.

33. Marty Speck, “Senate Set to Clear Foreign Operations,” CQ Weekly, November 2004. Lexis-Nexis Academic (30 November 2005).

34. Speck.

35. Wenger, 15.

36. Agence France Presse, “Israeli Press Hails Election Victory for Close Friend Bush,” Agence France Presse—English, 4 November 2005. Lexis Nexis Academic (1 December 2005).

37. Agence France Presse, “Israeli Press.”

38. Francis Harris, “America Would Back Israeli Attack on Iran,” London Daily Telegraph, 18 February 2005, 16. Lexis-Nexis Academic (1 December 2005).

39. Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (New York: Penguin, 1997), 100-101.

40. Ambrose and Brinkley, 157-158.

41. Jim Ennes and Joe Meadors, USS Liberty Memorial, 2005, (1 December 2005).

42. Wenger, 14-15.

43. Monshipouri, 72.

44. Monshipouri, 73.

45. Monshipouri, 74.

46. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee of Foreign Relations, Hearing on the Middle East: Rethinking the Road Map, Panel One, 108^th Cong., 2^nd sess., 2004. Lexis-Nexis Academic (29 November 2005).

47. Monshipouri, 70.

48. U.S. Congress, Panel Two.

49. “Statement of Robert Malley, Middle East and North African Program Director, International Crisis Group,” Hearing on the Middle East: Rethinking the Road Map, 108^th Cong., 2^nd sess., 2004. Lexis-Nexis Academic (29 November 2005).

50. Speck.